

Till Death Do Them Part

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We have read the commentaries with great interest. They vary to a high degree with respect to belief in the possibility of having a general model for separatist conflict solution, and there are certainly both practical problems as well as difficult priorities of principles. Several issues are addressed by more than one commentator so we chose a discussion by issue rather than by commentator.

Population transfer

Not surprisingly, the suggestion to relocate people after a split met the harshest comments, especially the right of the newly formed states to evict members of the other group to give place to members of the own group. What about people that do not want to move to the other side of the border? Esman, Rothchild, Ryan and James & James all mention the costs and traumas of enforced migration.

We want to remind our readers that the basic suggestion is to draw a new border between an A-land and B-land in order to minimize the number of group members remaining on the other side of the border and to keep the number of new minorities, i.e. Amin in B-land and Bmin in A-land, respectively, at about equal size. Accordingly, what follows upon a split is an exchange of people rather than a one way eviction, and this opens up the possibility for trading homes and switching jobs.

When people suffer high risk of rape and murder they do their best to get out of an area that their persecutors want to cleanse ethnically. We want to limit the use of such pressures and make it possible for a relocation to be an acceptable process, not a flight. If both countries are anti-liberal there will be an ethnic cleansing under dire conditions for their respective minorities. Adjustment to international pressure will make ethnic cleansing unofficial and statements will "regret unfortunate incidents caused by a few hooligans and militias uncontrolled by the authorities". Such declarations will be of little comfort to the minorities.

If a minority group continues to stay this implies - despite severe problems - a less barbarian treatment. The group will probably see their stubbornness more as a personal virtue and a sign indicating that their cause is just. However, semi-separation has a potential to keep an ethnic conflict alive. Without an eviction clause, the minority in the more liberal country can stay and constitute a significant stronghold for the less liberal country that probably will push the minority out of its own territory. The stronghold may then give potential rise to a new conflict when the less liberal country asks for another piece of land. By explicitly giving the new states the right to evict people the initiative for unofficial brutal cleansing is removed and the possibility to hold on for the next round of confrontation will be limited. We want to eliminate an advantage for the most expansionistic and aggressive group. We see no problem with individuals staying that have a local affection and an attitude of *A Roma a la romana*. A large out-group that wants to keep half a town would probably be expelled.

Our model promotes a long-term solution. Territorial changes more often reflect military power than ethnic loyalty. When territory is shuffled without taking ethnicity into consideration, severe problems may hibernate. The design of Hungary after World War I is an example of punishing a losing state by taking territory but leaving people. When Northern Ireland was cut out 0.5 million Irish Catholics were on the wrong side of the border. One could ponder over the stability of the Polish border if the 9 million Germans that lived east of the new frontier had stayed.

A separatist solution will not be uncontroversial, even after the vote is won and the separation implemented. Opposing groups are likely to voice their contradictory claims - a united AB-land, respectively a greater B-land - and accuse the supporters of the "civilized divorce" for selling out. But they will have problems to keep attention and dedication from their fellow men. Many will think it more rewarding to improve their lot in the new country than supporting a high-risk military project.

Also, the international community has a much easier monitoring task and can make credible threats to an aggressor attacking a neighboring country.

Abandoned unionists

In any conflict there will be B-people who are against a separation and for a continuation of AB-land. For these unionists both to move to A-land and to stay in an independent B-land is an impairment. McGarry & Moore see a major obstacle in that the interests of these people will be overrun in a decision for a split.

Thus, even if a majority both of A and of B is for a separation this problem remains and it is certainly not only a theoretical problem. An example is the thousands of Algerians that were known for their sympathies for *Algerie francais* and were butchered after the independence (Johnson 1983). There are other examples of similar tragedies. However, to build a principle against separation on this problem would be no less than a declaration of sacred frontiers. We would then basically have to oppose peaceful de-colonisation.

Another potential problem brought up by James & James are the effects of a separation for a third party such as a minority C not directly related to the AB conflict. It is reasonable to believe that the most negative scenario for C is an ethnic war between A and B and the preferred choice is a peaceful continuation of an AB-land. There are probably fewer risks for small minorities in established big states than in smaller states with high ethnic concern. Also, some rivalry between A and B might open up opportunities for C. In two more homogeneous countries C will stand out as more different regardless of whether they all live in A-land, B-land or both. This is definitely another negative consequence of separation, but insufficiently so to refute separation as a workable solution. For a half-nomadic people like Gypsies a large and multiethnic Austria-Hungary might have been preferred to a number of independent states. Again, drawing a parallel to de-colonization, it is not reasonable to keep Uganda under British rule in order to protect the Asian middle man minority.

A small group with no striking privileges and without threatening ethnocentric activities runs a very small risk in a liberal society. There are strong reasons to believe that liberalism provides much better protection than multiculturalism. So, if both cannot be obtained at the same time it is probably wise for the small minority to assess such a priority. Ethnic conflict is dangerous also for bystanders and solidarity demands, such as "those not for us are against us", can bring a third group into even more trouble.

As pointed out by Lustick and Ryan situations occur when a relative rich minority wants to break away from the rest of a country. An increased possibility to solve ethnic conflict through civilized divorce may then lead to greater incentive for separation based on inequality between regions with regard to natural resources. One question then, is whether creation of such "stranded majorities" makes separation unacceptable.

Normally a rich region will in effect subsidize a poorer, but will also get some benefits of their hard work or natural resources. The tolerance level of the relatively rich minority is often high and they view the whole country as their country. If, however, a politically dominant group succeeds in exploiting such a minority there will be feelings of discontent and then it may also seem quite reasonable to question further cooperation. A large group living in the capital and with high political influence might institutionalize a constant drain from the provinces to an idle city population. It is questionable whether rich minorities break away mainly for economic reasons. The Scottish nationalism (mentioned by Lustick) is much older than the discovery of North Sea oil. Moreover, it is often the poorer group that is attracted by separation, even if it benefits from redistribution within the country.

A clause granting the majority from impairment would be nothing less than to permanent the present order; Katanga would receive too much of the minerals, Biafra too many of the educated, and Eritrea too much of the coastline. Privileged separatists must of course live up to our proposed qualifications, but we do not think there should be any extra conditions based on resources. In many potential separatist cases there are likely disadvantages for the bigger "rump state", however, less disruptive than a separation war. The best policy - ethically and in the self-interest of the majority - is to avoid exploiting the minority to the extent that they opt for separation.

Demography and Democracy

Several commentators (James & James; Lustick; McGarry & Moore) bring up what they regard as an inconsistency - having a group based election for or against separation but advocating individual based democracy as a general principle. This is an important point that needs clarification because an election on separation is certainly not general liberalism with individual rights and universal suffrage. However, a separatist election is not a general election but an election on electorate. Universal suffrage, the "one person - one vote"-principle, does not apply on a global scale but within the borders of the state and a separatist election is primarily a question about the legitimate electorate. The widening of the right to vote, first to all economic strata of the male population and then to women, have occurred through a successive democratic process. Other decisions concerning the composition of the electorate have normally not been taken in a democratic process, but are the result of historic processes, to a large degree influenced by armed conflicts between ethnic groups. Therefore we regard our proposal more as a democratization of a normally non-democratic decision than a sliding of the liberal democratic procedure into a semi-democratic group think.

We do regard the liberal democratic as the main alternative, but what can be done if the confidence level between groups is too low? Should the international community bribe the groups into cooperation as they try to do in Bosnia? Consociationalistic deals and renegotiations easily follow a road towards corruption and disunity. To institutionalize group think and make it a part of everyday life seem to us a much longer step from universal suffrage and individual rights than our proposal of a one time adjustment. We therefore do not see us breaking universal principles to the same degree as the consociationalists.

Goetze asks about the proposed 100-year rule. Our model suggests a cure for persistent problems, not for short term discomfort. A large group of new immigrants or a new religious movement may be regarded, by themselves and others, as very different. This is however not enough in our eyes to make a claim for a separate state. After a long period such a group no longer consists of converts or immigrants, but of people born into the group following the ways of their parents - the group is reproduced the same way as other ethnic groups and it has obtained some kind of permanence. It may be well integrated with other inhabitants, but if relations are antagonistic the argument of temporariness is unconvincing. The 100 year period is to provide time for testing and accommodation over several generations. A new state also needs some credibility with regard to core and durability.

Esman and McGarry & Moore correctly notes that we put a lot of emphasis on ethnos but little on territory - maybe too little? We acknowledge that our model builds heavily on the present demographic situation - the 100-year rule being our major historic restriction. Many ethnic groups do not see it this way. For the Serbs the situation in 1389 before their defeat to the Turks is more significant for their right to Kosovo than the present situation with a heavy domination of Muslim Albanians.

A historic principle built on first rights is however very difficult to defend. Basically, the world belongs to victors, but granting the right to the oldest group known in an area would be to honor groups who themselves were successful in eliminating their predecessor and being less harshly treated by the next wave of conquerors. History would give Catholics primacy before Protestants and Muslims, but secondary position versus pre-Christian beliefs now marginalized. A primacy of history would be practically impossible and ethically dubious - an effort to run history backwards.

A new immigrant is a product of two countries but after several generations you belong to a certain country whether your forefather came as slave or conqueror, for fortune or from famine, to mission the true faith or to avoid its enforcers. We do not find it ethically defensible to let the children inherit the sins of their forefathers; looking back we are probably all fruits of many sinners and few saints, of the rapists as well as the raped. In the popular narcissism of the past the heritage from the conquerors was stressed but the current trend is to dwell on the hardships of the forefathers. This is all emotionally charged, but we see no real possibility to find a good rule for preferring one historic right before another.

Evolutionary roots

The commentary by Johnson is focused on the links between kin selection and group egoism, and we certainly agree that such links exist. First, during our evolutionary history and during the period "in which human psychological mechanisms were designed, humans were seldom, if ever thrown randomly into groups of people with whom they had had no previous contact". Thus, the highest degree of relatedness has generally been to members of the own group. It is therefore highly likely that several mechanisms and recognition markers used in ingroup/outgroup phenomena have their roots in kin selection and such mechanisms may indeed have preadapted humans for building larger and more complex group alliances.

However, even when considering mechanisms the kin model has difficulty to explain why we do not always choose a smaller group with stronger ethnic markers that reasonable trigger proximate mechanisms, such as local people speaking just like me rather than leaders from the capital. Nationalism has succeeded to bring together many regions with visible phenotypic differences in spite of local counter agitation. Now, one reason why formation of large groups is possible can again be related back to kin selection if such larger group cohesion can be attained through various myths of common decent and the "fictive use of kin terms" (Johnson). Since such leader talk is common, it may well be that triggers like these (based on a "process of classical conditioning") may overrule kin recognition markers such as association, location and phenotypic matching. Accordingly, mechanisms related to kin selection can be inferred on several levels to explain group egoistic phenomena. However, we hold that the relative importance for group cohesion of all such mechanisms are largely untested, both in relation to each other and in relation to other factors.

There is usually little empirical substance behind a putative explanation how, on a psychological level, pseudo kin theories like "perceived kin" (Shaw and Wong 1989) or "myths of common decent" (Connors 1994) influence human behavior, and therefore such explanations can be neither rejected nor confirmed. As a general explanation for group egoism the concepts of pseudo kin theories can explain everything and therefore they become empty. Real kin interest on the other hand is by no means an empty concept, but a strong force in contemporary societies explaining the significant investment in time and resources that humans do for their children and other relatives.

Even if most of human psychology has been shaped in a Pleistocene environment, it is difficult to understand why we should lack the ability to estimate our real interests under present circumstances. Thus, focusing on real interests, our point is that group egoistic phenomena is something that extend beyond de facto kin interests, and that kin selection as such cannot explain certain aspects of group egoism. It does not explain the variation in size among human groups, especially the large size of many groups. Neither does it explain the flexible and opportunistic character of human group formation. We think that the reason why this is possible is that the group egoistic disposition can dominate so that the larger group can be chosen over the smaller despite weaker kin triggers. Kin selection can explain the choice of an in-group versus an out-group, but not the choice of a wide before a closer in-group. Not only fission but also fusion need an explanation.

Goetze recognizes two important dimensions of groups, namely intensity and durability, and sees no reason why intensity could not be manifested by other than ethnic groups. We agree with him that it is likely to be the durability factor that is more pronounced in ethnic groups, and we also hold that under normal conditions other group affiliations are much more intense than the ethnic.

Science and solutions

One commentator, Falger, objects to the ambition of reaching normative conclusions. He claims that "If in the end, science is to judge which choices are better or worse, the scientists doing so have become politicians, forgetting that trespassing the line between "is" and "ought" is falling in the trap of the naturalistic fallacy". Scholars interested in evolution frequently warn against the dangers of committing the Naturalistic Fallacy (e.g. Ruse 1986) but no one has given convincing arguments as to the nature of this fallacy. In order to rise above pure semantics we believe that a distinction between a weak and a strong sense of the Naturalistic Fallacy is fruitful.

The Naturalistic Fallacy in a weak sense simply claims that in order to reach a value judgment there has to be at least one value among the premises, not only facts. This principle can score a rhetoric point when, for example, a medical scientist advocates a vaccination "based on pure facts". A philosophically inclined person will point out that there are indeed some values included in the

recommendation, such as that health and survival is preferable to illness and death. The values are often trivial, whereas the facts, causation chains, and risk estimates are complicated and controversial. If an issue consists of some mostly shared values and a number of crucial facts, it is difficult to find faults with putting the main argumentative effort on the latter. The thesis in the weak sense is nothing but trivial, and it does not implicate excluding facts from normative discussions.

In the strong sense the Naturalistic Fallacy has a message, but then the question arises if the claim can be supported by reasonable arguments. In the strong sense a complete separation is advocated between science that is only about facts, and normative (political and ethical) statements that only concern values. We were surprised to read Falgers recommendation of Beckstroms book. We find the book that Falger coedited (Reynols, Falger & Vine 1987) a lot better; it has the virtue of spelling out its radical position concerning the thesis in the strong sense.

A bold example illustrates the claim that facts bring no ethical message. "But then, if we are to argue that they [the Nazis] made a naturalistic fallacy in developing a racist 'ought' from a putative 'is' by what epistemological standard do we derive our 'ought' of the unity of humankind from our putative 'is' of the unity of humankind? If science cannot support racist nationalism, neither can it support liberal humanitarianism or any other normative, ethical construct. We are forced to reassert that science is totally irrelevant in the choice of public policies" (page 267) This is the Naturalistic Fallacy thesis taken seriously. However, we do not agree but rather side with Masters: "When a naturalistic approach is used in political science, it does not follow that we can say nothing about the relative desirability of different regimes. Such a conclusion would make as little sense as the assertion that the science of medicine makes it impossible to define health and prefer it to illness" (1989, p 227)

The other side of the radical split between facts and values, the independence of ethical statements from such factual restraints as given by our history and our biology is also spelled out by Ben Ike in Falger's book. Even if we "would not have become 'man' at all [without intraspecific massacres] it might still be legitimate morally to condemn any bloodshed whenever, wherever, by whomever, and for whatever reason" (page 218). We would object to this statement not only as being extremely aloof but for advocating hypocrisy. To condemn the lion for killing antelopes is ok for a child, but ridiculous for a grown up. To condemn a person for an act that almost everybody would do in the same situation (with all probability also the person himself) is simply hypocritical, not favoring high standards. Norms of what one ought to follow are to a high degree a function of facts in the world for which the norms are proposed (Tullberg & Tullberg 1996).

A more common objection against science trespassing into ethics or politics is a pragmatic concern for tarnishing the good name of science. However, science deals with a large number of important issues with political implications, and although we do not advocate a rule of experts, an exclusion of scientists from issues considered political or ethical would be to pass a possibility of progressive influence. The scientist is not turning into politician, but rather than having an obligation to stand back and let the politicians discuss issues based upon what they think and feel, the scientist has an obligation to contribute as an expert. Input is needed from economists about how to treat unemployment, physicists about the danger of nuclear energy, and medical doctors about the treatment of Aids. Why not advice from political science about how to solve actual and future conflicts?

Practice and principles

A parent listening to two children quarrelling about a toy might be tempted to side with the most excited to minimize the conflict. Soon, both children will learn the name of the game and act more self-righteous and hysterical. Given a more long term ambition a parent has to involve himself and promote some ethical principle, like a prime right for the first child playing with a toy even if the other becomes inspired. If being stubborn and extreme has a pay-off people will adjust. In all kinds of negotiations the representatives will tie themselves up with promises to their own hardliners, because a limited mandate for the leader makes him unable to make concessions, which forces the other party to do more yielding. Without ethical principles such mechanic game-theoretical behavior will dominate and one can easily envisage a point where prolonged conflict appears more attractive for a leader than a settlement. The situation is not improved by the fact that leader interest often leans towards prolongation and escalation of conflict, as pointed out by Carment.

Implementation of our suggested model will no doubt motivate creative interpretations of the definition of an ethnic group (van der Dennen). A-leaders will say that aspiring Bs are not an ethnic group at all,

but maybe a "pseudo-chauvinistic fraction". As acknowledged, we are well aware that splitting the country is not the first choice of most majority groups, but in cases when forced cohabitation looks too uncomfortable they might still go for the proposed solution. Most people understand that few problems can be defined away.

Some Bleaders will claim that they represent the true interests of the Bpeople and it is of less importance that many Bs have been threatened or bribed. The holy cause is independent of the support of such people. But will such arguments hold? Since the decline of the reign of supreme kings endorsed by God, the opinion of the people holds a strong position as the ultimate source of power. A solution connected to that principle is necessary.

According to Falger "there are no solutions" to ethnic strife. However, a conflict solves itself sooner or later, perhaps after long time and much bloodshed, but finally it ends, if not for any other reason than yielding to a new conflict. Several of the commentators argue against having general principles related to ethnic strife. However, we must ask whether there are no better solution than just letting things happen. If there are no agreement on ethical principles there will be other, more mechanical and less acknowledged, principles at work. The law of least resistance is such a mechanism working on both participants and observers. In the main article we elaborated on two others; the observer's ethnic bias and pity priority.

Despite our lukewarm view of separatist demands many commentators fear that our principles would open a Pandora's box, that it would be an incitement for separatist movements. Several authors think there will be no possibility to limit this special right to ethnic groups but it will explode to all kinds of groups. We certainly agree with Lustick that there will be an abundant supply of potential leader - but the question is, why should the rank and file in general be interested in a state bureaucracy of their own? Why should we expect such a general enthusiasm? For most groups there is no attraction at all in separatism; the *raison d'être* of the group is to muster favors from the state to their members, not to dissolve this source of supply.

We would also like to point out that our model is restrictive in comparison with many real cases of separations or suggestions thereof. For example, it would not have allowed Croats to separate without solving the situation with Krajina and other Serb dominated areas. Neither would it let a greater Bosnia to separate. Moreover, 51% of the votes would not be enough to let Quebec separate, neither would the whole Quebec area be separated from the rest of Canada given a 67% majority of the French Canadian votes. We claim that the model steers not only to a peaceful but also to a fair solution. Such a connection should be expected since legitimacy, balance and stern principles all are essential for long-term and robust peace.

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