Tullberg, J. 2002. Reciprocity - Ethical norms and practical cooperation. Ph.D. thesis.

This is a summary of the core paper. In addition to this paper there are four separate papers that focus on different questions that are parts of the larger project. The core paper concludes the dissertation as a whole.

Chapter 1
The main interest of the dissertation is the ethics of reciprocity. The two main rivals to reciprocity are the ethics of integrity and the ethics of altruism. The comparison is penetrated from a foundation based in three disciplines: ethics, sociobiology and game experiments. The ambition is to make contributions with regard to the following three issues.

1/ A theoretical development of the ethics of reciprocity. The main parts of this contribution are the three articles following this core paper. The first article discusses the concept indirect reciprocity. The second article penetrates the strength and weaknesses of the arguments against ethical egoism. The third article discusses the importance of compliance and the necessity of incitements for an ethics with serious ambitions. In the core paper there are further contributions such as discussions of the relation between reciprocity and the lex talionis (the rule ’an eye for an eye ...’ ) and the comparability between reciprocity and the golden rule. One task is to clarify and systematize the boundaries between the three ethical spheres. A second task is to expand the questions of ethics from mere opinions on desired behavior to possibilities and effects of its implementation. This is essential since implementation considerations should influence the choice of ethical rules.

2/ An empirical investigation of the connection between behavior and ethical norms. Ethics should be manifested in behavior rather than just statements of non-revealed preferences. This empirical effort is described in the fourth article in the dissertation ’ Ethical norms and behavior in an economic experiment’.

3/ A discussion about the criteria to use in the judgment of norms. According to which standard are different ethical suggestions to be considered better or worse than other normative alternatives? A model for such an evaluation is suggested in chapter 3 of the core paper.

Chapter 2
The three ethical spheres, as outlined in chapter 1, are penetrated in more detail. The ethical systems can be seen as three alternative strategies that one might adopt. Egoism is not so simply the same as integrity ethics. Rather it is egoistically advantageous to speak for altruism and perform symbolic altruistic acts in most social circumstances. But ethics is to a substantial degree a question of long-term strategy, and then the result of an analysis is not self-evident. This analysis indicates that there are weak reasons to accept the common altruistic recommendations favored in for example the Christian and the socialist traditions.

Chapter 3
Here a model of evaluation is developed. Four criteria are suggested for adopting a coherent ethics. The first is the criterion of truth. This means that the statement must be compatible with a scientific view of the world. The second criterion is the one of consistency. Different judgements, principles and moral reasoning should be in agreement with each other. This criterion implies some demands on the more aloof principles, but more crucially on a correspondence between high principles and more mundane instructions in the field of prescriptive ethics. The third criterion is one of honesty. An ethics of ambition, of stimulating others, of agitation, does not meet this criterion. Suggestions for behavior and rules that might be excellent pep talk should be seen just as that, useful pep talk. To qualify as good ethics they also need to be seriously implemented. The fourth criterion is that of utility. An ethical suggestion needs not only be a serious effort, it also needs to be proven valuable in practice. High hopes and theoretical qualities are not valid substitutes for practical beneficial effects.

These four criteria result in a more demanding evaluation model than is normally practiced. Most justifications for ethics appear very limited; from just a few axiomatic assumptions a conclusion is searched for, preferably, as a logical necessity. These attempts can be seen as efforts to meet the second criterion, consistency. The reason for failure is that logic and first principles are not sufficient. A broader perspective is necessary, not least an influence from the sciences regarding what we know about man; his history, his behavior, and his physical being.

One idea would be to view the three ethical spheres as different strategies for individuals and societies in dealing with the egocentric predicament. How should we handle our tendency to see things from our own point of view? The potential for integrity and altruism is that they imply some simplification of the analysis that might result in less demanding conditions upon cooperation. If the egocentric predicament has caused a general bias of too high demands on cooperation, by e.g. exaggerating one’s contribution, such a counter bias could be a beneficial correction. This reasoning provides ground for rationality of non-reciprocal strategies.

Chapter 4
This chapter presents the four articles that together with the core paper constitute the dissertation. These articles all have English abstracts and the reader is asked to look in respective articles for these abstracts.

Chapter 5
Here the different parts of the dissertation are incorporated for a conclusion. Using the four criteria of the model, an evaluation is made of the three spheres.

-The truth criterion has not been addressed specifically in this dissertation, but is considered in other works by the author and briefly described in this chapter. The primary conclusion is that efforts to make altruistic ethics compatible with evolution theory have failed. In contrast the rationale of reciprocity and the development of reciprocal emotional inclinations are well established.

- The consistency criterion carries few problems for reciprocity. The argument of hope, developed by Kant, exposes inconsistency in the critique of reciprocity rather than in reciprocity itself. It is human to hope for more than one deserves, but what is such a wish but unprincipled egoism? It is difficult not to see the one-sided benefit for a receiver as more important for the popularity of altruism than one-sided giving. The verbal focus on the latter part does not diminish the attraction of the former. Here also lies a serious consistency problem for altruism that grows to a serious moral problem of preaching altruism. Is it not fooling the naive man that he should give his possessions, labor and affections away and get nothing in return? Is this not exactly what the criminal tries to obtain through illegal methods? Altruism is not stealing, but the line toward fraud is a thin one.

- The honesty criterion is neglected in much of ethics. The problem raised by Glaukon is still not treated with merit. Social advantages are not associated with virtue but the appearance of virtue. Virtue without good-will effects will mainly carry costs. To sustain virtue it is necessary to bind the appearance and real virtue tight together. This implies honesty. For reciprocity there is little potential in dishonesty, since each violation of honesty can be expected to weaken the potential benefits of reciprocity. Altruism is to a high degree compromised by dishonesty since benefits are expected through an ethics of ambition. Humans are torn between a soul considered strong and a flesh experienced to be weak, but an altruistic spirit is expected to improve behavior by a vaulting ambition. Altruism’s attraction to speculations about intentions further weakens the connection to honesty.

- The fourth criterion is utility. Donald Campbell brings the point that the fact that all societies have a substantial amount of altruistic agitation should be interpreted as a strong indication that it has an adaptive effect for human societies. Altruistic teaching is often inconsistent, and there exists a huge difference between normative statements and actual behavior. But maybe it might still, despite, or even because of these shortcomings, function as an effective pro-social force. Maybe a society without it would disintegrate? This reasoning is probably the best there is for an altruistic morality, but not convincing in my opinion. The achievements of modern society can be connected to changes in attitudes and values. These new rules in practical prescriptive ethics are a product of a substantial influence of integrity and reciprocity and a decreasing influence of altruistic ethics. In my judgment, the utility criterion also tends to favor reciprocity over altruism.

Altruism has such a strong standing that it is seldom radically questioned. Altruism can be marginally criticized for lacking in realism, for being impractical, out of touch with behavior of ordinary humans, etc. But the critics seldom see it as destructive or as implying alternative costs caused by misallocation in social preaching. Even writers making strong arguments for reciprocity shun from making a straightforward comparison. Altruism is seen as a non-replaceable part of morality.

Since ethics has not yet developed to a science, there is nothing like ’the present opinion of science’. However the strong standing of altruism in philosophy and religion makes it motivated to see altruism as a substitute. The purpose of this paper has been to launch an alternative theory and compare strengths and weaknesses. The focus, inherent in previous comparisons has left the third sphere, the ethics of integrity somewhat neglected.

Tying back to the three issues presented in chapter 1, I conclude that some contributions have been made in each issue. The development of reciprocal theory motivates questioning Allen Buchanan’s declaration ”no convincing argument has yet been made for why we should reject common-sense morality and adopt justice as reciprocity” (1991, p 119). The empirical effort to check the links between specific ethical opinions and practical behavior is a minor step, but in an important direction. Ethics has to develop towards practical relevance rather than strive for a limited consistency of more or less circular character. The third issue, the evaluation model, is a step to obtain such a broader effort. Together the different issues support each other and indicate a more comprehensive and substantial way of discussing ethics than what is common in the field of philosophy. It also indicates advantages for more substantial and grounded ethics in the ethical discourse that has been dominated by idealistic alternatives.